Of all the advances, there seems to be general agreement among GPS pioneers that the groundbreaking ranging signal they devised for the system—which remains largely unchanged 25 years after the system was completed—contributed more than any other technical advance to its successful implementation and overall performance, versatility, and effectiveness. Woodford and Nakamura had set the stage with their assessment that passive users of a four-inview constellation would not need bulky, expensive atomic clocks. Fleshing out the concept called for each satellite to broadcast not only its own orbital description and position coordinates, but also system time, the spacecraft’s transmitter status, ionospheric delay models, and much more—even the orbital and position details for all other operational, sister satellites in the constellation.
Yet those continuous broadcasts could only transmit all of this information at a meager data rate to ensure that enough power was available for the critical ranging signals. Because of the restrictive GPS budget, the JPO had opted to save millions of dollars by initially using refurbished intercontinental ballistic missiles for its satellite launches. The thrust capability of those relatively low-cost, Atlas-F boosters limited the launch weight of each satellite, and hence the size of its solar array and, ultimately, the available transmitter power. The GPS developers could only reliably deliver a signal strength on Earth of a tenth of a millionth of a billionth of a watt. The system’s specifications therefore guaranteed no more than this 10–16 W to receiver makers, and the satellites made do with their limited power by transmitting no faster than a mere 50 bits of data per second.
Each GPS satellite would relay its information by modulating two high-frequency carrier signals (1.2276 and 1.57542 GHz) that the constellation continuously beamed to users below. The JHUAPL designers and builders of the earlier Transit system had pioneered the use of this ‘‘dual frequency” means of directly measuring the frequency-dependent delays of satellite signals that passed through the ionosphere. ‘‘Fortunately, the delay is inversely proportional to the square of the carrier signal frequency,” said Penny Axelrad, a GNSS expert and professor of aerospace engineering sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder. ‘‘By receiving signals on two, or three, different frequencies, the GPS receiver can easily correct for this effect.” The inexpensive GPS chips in today’s smartphones can execute a similar solution. Transmitting at more frequencies costs satellites precious power, but the technique provides independent ranging signals and effectively enables users to calculate distances to constellation satellites exactly enough to fix their positions with great precision.
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, electronic circuitry was transitioning from analog technology to lower power, compact, long-lived digital components. This evolved into the integrated circuits of today that have enabled massive improvements in computing. An inventive community of mathematicians and computer scientists discovered novel processing capabilities for digital signals and applied them to communications, sensing, control systems, and other fields. Within 621B, a hardware demonstration of these techniques for radio-ranging was already occurring in the New Mexico Desert (further described below), when approval for the initial four-satellite demonstration came through.
To meet the needs of the evolving GPS effort, in-house engineers and digital-signal-processing experts from industry had focused on a communications protocol known as Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA). By assigning a mathematically distinct code to each satellite, the CDMA protocol made it possible for all satellites to broadcast on the same frequency, without mutual interference or data loss. At the same time, all user receivers could simultaneously range to each satellite by accurately measuring the arrival time from each of four or more satellites in view.
In field tests of the CDMA-based scheme conducted in 1971– 1973 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the 621B team deployed two types of prototype CDMA receivers built by electronics industry companies on contract to the program. These receivers detected and processed the signals emanating from four ‘‘pseudolites,” ground-based transmitters that simulated the broadcasts of GPS satellites. Engineers then compared the computed position fixes with the instruments’ actual locations measured with lasers installed on the testing range. The calculated and laser-pinpointed locations were within 5 m (circular error probable) of each other in three dimensions. These findings helped gain approval for the four-satellite demonstration, resolving the doubts of some in the Pentagon and confirming that a global system of real satellites with four-in-view accessibility and CDMA could deliver the unprecedented level of position accuracy the JPO had claimed was feasible.
4.2. Orbiting atomic clocks
As the project’s engineers prepared for the crucial, four-satellite tests in the late 1970s, the clock technology needed by the GPS did not yet exist. While the four-in-view satellite condition eliminated the need for an atomic clock in each GPS receiver, this benefit came at a price. The entire constellation needed to synchronize its signals to nanoseconds—a few billionths of a second. Although this could be achieved with a continuous signal from a GPS ground control network, a better solution would be to install very stable clocks to ‘‘flywheel” time aboard each GPS satellite, with calibration occurring once or twice a day.
Commercial atomic clocks using beams of cesium atoms, which were first developed in the 1950s, could meet the GPS timing specifications. Unfortunately, the temperature swings of spaceflight would harm the accuracy of those clocks, which were built for laboratory use. Furthermore, intense ionospheric radiation in the region where the GPS was to orbit, which could kill an unshielded human in less than a minute, would also rapidly destroy the clocks. Moreover, these sophisticated instruments took up too much room and weighed too much to meet satellite volume and weight limitations. The GPS needed much smaller clocks that were highly stable and well protected from the extreme environment of space.
Whereas Woodford and Nakamura’s 1966 report encouraged the USAF to initiate a clock development program aimed at such goals, Easton’s group in the USN had already begun this work. Aboard the test satellites the NRL used to assess potential position accuracy and other aspects of its envisioned Timation system, the lab included experiments on simple quartz clocks; on novel, miniaturized, rubidium atomic clocks made by the small firm Efratom Elektronik GmbH of Munich, Germany (which later opened an office Munich, Germany (which later opened an office in California); and on compact cesium-beam atomic clocks crafted by the small contractor Frequency and Time Systems, Inc. (FTS) of Danvers, MA (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. (a) Designed by the German firm Efratom in partnership with Rockwell International, lightweight, compact, low-power rubidium atomic clocks like the one shown here enabled the first four GPS satellites to achieve the demonstration project’s milestones. (b) The fifth GPS satellite carried a compact, space-hardened cesium-beam atomic clock like this one, built by the Danvers, MA, contractor FTS. Credit (both): Dane A. Penland, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution (public domain).
During a decade of in-space clock trials by the NRL that began in 1967, instabilities in the satellites’ three-dimensional orientations (attitude) plagued the tests. Variability in where, from what angle, and when sunlight would most strongly strike the spacecraft made internal temperatures changeable, causing the quartz clocks’ frequencies to change as well, even with onboard temperature compensation. The results of these trials made it clear that simple quartz devices would not suffice for GPS. Regarding the atomic clocks, however, which were yet to be hardened against the extremes of temperature, radiation, or mechanical stress, the unsteady conditions mainly rendered the tests inconclusive.
A typical rubidium atomic clock made at that time by a large company would be ~30 cm tall and 48 cm wide, designed for mounting on an industrial electronics rack. In contrast, each lightweight, compact, low-power, Efratom rubidium clock was contained in a 10 cm cube, which encapsulated a vapor of rubidium atoms and other gases as its timing source. By the time a 1974 NRL field evaluation of a pair of rubidium clocks returned ambiguous results, the four-satellite demonstration project had been approved, and the JPO had hired Rockwell International of Seal Beach, CA, to build the first GPS satellites. With the launch date planned for 1978, Rockwell partnered directly with Efratom to produce space-hardened versions of their promising rubidium clocks. In the meantime, FTS was developing a prototype space-hardened, cesium-beam clock that the NRL tested on another satellite launched in 1977, again with indeterminate results, with the exception of one clock that apparently worked well until its power supply failed just 12 h into the evaluation.
Nonetheless, the miniature, space-hardened, Efratom/Rockwell rubidium clocks met the stability and robustness requirements, allowing the first four GPS satellites to achieve the demonstration milestones. ‘‘An atomic clock, a small atomic clock, is just as much of a world-changer as GPS is,” said Hugo Fruehauf, who was Rockwell’s GPS chief engineer at the time [
1]. Fluent in German, Fruehauf had worked closely with the clock’s Efratom co-developers. On the fifth GPS satellite, launched in 1980, a space-hardened FTS cesium clock finally succeeded in space, the first of a series of space-worthy cesium clocks that proved to be at least as stable as the rubidium clocks that initially enabled GPS to meet all of its design objectives[
9,
11].
Despite the extraordinary accuracy and stability of its newly achieved atomic clocks, the satellite system still had to compensate for an unavoidable timing discrepancy due to relativistic effects. As general relativity predicts, space clocks run faster than terrestrial clocks in control stations and in user receivers on Earth because of the weaker gravitational field at the orbiting clocks’ altitude of 22 200 km. If nothing were done about this rate difference, the satellites’ clocks would get ahead of ground clocks by ~45 μs·d-1 . In addition, in accordance with special relativity, the rapid velocities of the space clocks stretch out the time intervals they are measuring, slowing down their ‘‘ticking” in comparison with groundbased timepieces. This lessens the timing mismatch to ~38.6 μs·d-1 . To eliminate that remaining difference, GPS operators slightly reduce, by about 0.006 Hz, the roughly 10 MHz frequencies of the on-satellite, atomic clocks prior to launch. Without this adjustment, GPS-determined positions would be thrown off by ~10 km·d-1 , a debilitating error that would only grow with time.
4.3. Long-lived satellites
Short-lived satellites can bankrupt a space program because of the high cost of constructing and launching replacements. For example, the satellites in the first, then Soviet Union, GLONASS constellation lasted only 2–3 years on average. This lifespan translated into 8–12 new satellites and launches needed per year to keep the GLONASS 24-satellite constellation fully operational.
Aiming for long GPS satellite lifetimes from the start, Rockwell International adopted quality-control measures, including redundancy of the most failure-prone components, painstaking practices for parts selection that downgraded bad performers, extensive component monitoring in flight, and follow-up analyses of equipment failures. These efforts paid off, with the first ten GPS satellites lasting an average of 7.6 years (Fig. 7). During the GPS II generation era, satellite mean lifespan reached 10–12 years, which required 2– 3 replacement launches annually. The latest GPS III satellites, which began launching in late 2018, are intended to have a 15-year lifespan, with four of these satellites in one orbit as of November 2020.
Fig. 7. Engineers testing the third prototype GPS satellite before its launch in 1978. Credit: The Aerospace Corporation (public domain).
The engineers and scientists who devised the Transit system had pioneered advanced capabilities for predicting the orbital trajectories of its satellites. This was a critical need for Transit, and the goals for the GPS had even more stringent requirements. For example, the planet-circling paths of navigation satellites can take them out of sight for hours from active ground stations that upload the updated coordinates to the constellation. In the case of Transit, as its roster of orbiting satellites filled up, Guier and fellow JHUAPL scientists used observations of the spacecraft’s trajectories to refine gravitational models of Earth. They then fed the improved data into satellite-orbit and terrestrial-position calculations. Whereas the early Transit system’s position accuracy was off by up to 1 km, the error margin dropped to 99 m as the models improved—significantly better than the project’s stated goal of 185 m accuracy. As the program matured, the static horizontal errors decreased to 25 m (Transit did not provide vertical position) [
12].
Building on Transit’s success, GPS developers created enhanced orbital models for predicting ephemerides (trajectories) that accounted for the planet’s gravitational field and tides; solar and Earth radiation; and the wandering position of the planet’s spin axis, which can vary by up to around 15 m. In addition, the space-hardened clocks developed for GPS satellite time synchronization enabled further improvements in orbital prediction accuracy. For GPS to consistently deliver its intended position accuracy, the models underlying its satellites’ orbit predictions could add no more than a few meters to the receivers’ satellite ranging errors during 1.45 × 10
8 m of orbital travel [
11]. Because GPS also needed to recalculate its models quicker than the Transit system, its development team had to devise a novel mathematical approach capable of generating expected orbital paths in near real time.
A heartbreaking tragedy and, later, the first Iraq war enabled the GPS enterprise to meet the last of the five key engineering challenges: developing inexpensive user equipment to provide rapid access to PNT data. This advance would ultimately drive the technology’s acceptance and adoption by both the military and civilians worldwide.
The tragedy struck in 1983, when the Soviet Union mistook the off-course Korean Airlines passenger flight 007 for a spy plane and shot it down, killing all 269 people aboard. In response, US President Ronald Reagan guaranteed the GPS civilian signal for global use; although the specifications for using the GPS civilian signal had been freely available from the start, they had not been guaranteed. The early GPS system had implemented ‘‘selective availability,” meaning that it broadcast two distinct signals, one for the military and the second for civilian use. Whereas anyone could access the less accurate civilian signal, only the US military could access the signal with best accuracy (to ensure its advantage in battle). Nevertheless, the civilian signal would suffice to avoid gross navigation errors like the one that led to flight 007’s deadly mistake. Reagan also pledged to give no less than ten years notice of the system shutting down. Significantly, Reagan’s guarantee and this pledge reassured electronics companies about the future prospects for GPS. Firms started developing and manufacturing GPS receivers in greater numbers, although these devices were initially expensive specialty items, especially those designed for the military, which slowed their adoption.
The JPO had tried to seed the military demand by issuing contracts to create a family of demonstration military receivers designed to meet a range of different goals, sizes, and prices. The nine varieties of user instruments that the program designed and built in limited quantities tended to be bulky and heavy, with large power demands (Fig. 8). The largest device was a massive military console taller than a person, which was meant for permanent installation in a large aircraft; it was outfitted with five channels and seated two operators in front of a bank of electronics racks as wide as five people standing side by side. This device demonstrated that GPS could operate undeterred by a 1 kW enemy jammer just a few thousand feet below it. Smaller units, each with a fat rod antenna, included an 11 kg ‘‘manpack” to sling on a soldier’s back, another version to mount on a military jeep, and a civilian prototype about the size of a clock radio.
Fig. 8. (a) The first military GPS five-channel receiver built in 1977 by the company now known as Rockwell Collins was intended for use in an airplane. Weighing more than 120 kg, the device was mounted on a USAF equipment flight test pallet. (b) Two soldiers test early models of the ~11 kg GPS ‘‘manpack” receivers in 1978, each with a fat rod antenna. (c) A state-of-the-art GPS chip in 2017. Credits: Rockwell Collins (public domain); USAF (public domain); Wikimedia Commons (CC0 1.0).
Lacking military-grade receivers in its inventory just prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm, the DoD itself started ordering civilian receivers in large quantities, which supplemented the ones sent to the Middle East by the family and friends of savvy soldiers. The USAF operators of GPS also temporarily shut off the selective availability that degraded the civilian signal, permitting troops to use the civilian gear with full accuracy. Ultimately, nearly 90% of the receivers that the US armed forces used in Desert Storm were civilian ones; the DoD had purchased 10 000 from Trimble Navigation and 3000 more from Magellan Systems [
2].
When combat began in mid-January 1991, television viewers saw astonishing weapon delivery accuracy that wiped out the Iraq Air Force. Widespread use of GPS also enabled the US Army to navigate effectively through the featureless desert and target enemy artillery with unprecedented and devastating accuracy. These striking demonstrations of the PNT capability promised by the developers of GPS finally convinced the military services—which had long been reluctant participants in its creation—of the system’s enormous value.
Until Desert Storm, however, misgivings and misunderstandings about satellite navigation and skepticism about its military value had persisted after the June 1979 approval for building the full satellite constellation. In fact, the Office of the Secretary of Defense eliminated the GPS budget for 1980 through 1982. Although the budget was soon reinstated, it was slashed by 30%, or 500 million USD, for the fiscal years 1981–1986. This cut decreased the targeted constellation size by a quarter, to 18 satellites plus three spares. It also slowed the development of the more advanced, next-generation ‘‘Block II” satellites. By 1988, due to concerns that an 18-satellite system would underperform, the DoD restored the constellation’s satellite number to 24, including three spares. Plans for Block II satellites were also reinstated [
2].
Nonetheless, budget issues continued to slow the development of GPS, impose new and unexpected technical and management hurdles, and stretch out the construction timeline of the complete GPS system. ‘‘We developed the new, full system, as Mal Currie requested, with the same budget as intended for the test program. Money was always an issue,” recalled now-retired USAF Colonel Gaylord Green, a guidance and navigation engineer who played major roles in all phases of GPS development [
1]. Parkinson originally knew Green as a fellow graduate student at Stanford who later worked for him in the USAF reentry vehicle program; when Parkinson took the reins of 621B, he invited Green to join the satellite navigation project. Green later served as director of the GPS program from 1985 to 1988.
Still, some setbacks to the GPS occurred independently of the rivalries and budget ups and downs within the US military. The fiery Challenger shuttle launch disaster in 1986 halted GPS satellite launches, which had been assigned to the space shuttle fleet in 1979. It took two years for launches to recommence using Delta II rockets. Nevertheless, the project benefited when other military programs saw opportunities to use GPS to support their own goals and bolstered the navigation system’s budget. When the USN needed a way to track tests of Trident missiles launched in broad ocean regions, Parkinson and James Spilker, a digital communications pioneer and major contributor to the design of GPS, proposed a way to use GPS signals to do the job. The DoD’s acceptance of that proposal boosted the number of GPS satellites in the four-satellite demonstration phase of the project by two, transferring 66 million USD from the USN to the USAF program.
The US nuclear disarmament program also provided a GPS budget increase by adding nuclear detonation sensors to the satellites. Intended to help assess nuclear strikes, the sensors also monitored compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to Green, adding these sensors did more than just provide needed funding. Before the full GPS system was given final approval, the budget analysis had concluded that it failed to provide enough military utility, said Green. ‘‘The nuclear detonation detection system gave us enough military utility to get the program approved.”
In July 1995, just a few years after Desert Storm, the USAF announced the full operation of GPS—some 22 years after the 1973 approval for the four-satellite demonstration of the concept [
13]. In the same year, the independent nation of Russia, to which the GLONASS satellite system had passed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, declared the 24-satellite array fully operational, for military use only. But the constellation quickly fell into disrepair, shrinking to seven satellites by 2002 and triggering a Russian restoration that has enabled the system to again become fully operational [
14]. Now, after 25 years of operation, GPS has other company besides GLONASS. China recently completed its GNSS, called BeiDou, with a launch on 23 June 2020 that increased the constellation’s size to its full complement of satellites. The EU’s Galileo system is nearly complete and expected to become fully operational with 24 active satellites plus six spares by 2022. ‘‘The Chinese system and Galileo are comparable to GPS, but GLONASS has never been a competitor to GPS in terms of quality of signals or positioning.” said Todd Humphreys, a GNSS expert and associate professor of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics at the University of Texas at Austin, who directs the university’s Radionavigation Laboratory.
In hindsight, if the USAF had fully welcomed satellite navigation and supported the GPS project, the system could have been completed closer to 1985 than 1995, said Parkinson, who retired from the USAF in 1978. He entered civilian life as a professor at Colorado State University in Ft. Collins, CO, then became a vice president at Rockwell, and next a group vice president at Intermetrics in Cambridge, MA. With GPS still in his blood, he dreamt up civilian applications for the satellite system that continued to slowly take shape within the reluctant military establishment, turning many of those ideas into sketches (Fig. 9).
Fig. 9. (a) Automobile navigation system; (b) semi-automatic crop dusting; (c) automatic dam fault monitoring; (d) wide-area vehicle monitoring. These sketches were created in 1980 and 1981 by Professor Bradford Parkinson, who led the advocacy, design, and development of GPS as the first director of the GPS program from 1972 to 1978. The sketches outline civilian applications Parkinson envisioned at the time for GPS, including the now ubiquitous GPS navigation systems for automobiles and other vehicles, today run from cell phones, that have rendered printed road maps largely obsolete. e.t.a.: estimated time of arrival. Credit: Bradford Parkinson, with permission.
In 1984, Parkinson returned to Stanford University as a full professor of aeronautics and astronautics. Through the 1990s, among other achievements, he led a research group that devised a host of high-precision civilian uses for GPS (as did hundreds of engineers at many other academic institutions and private companies). For example, whereas ordinary GPS signals provide sufficient accuracy to aid long-range navigation for airlines and other civil aviation carriers, guiding aircraft onto runways in darkness or inclement weather requires much higher integrity and accuracy. Before GPS, many airports provided this guidance with complex and expensive Instrument Landing Systems. Sponsored by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Parkinson, faculty colleagues, and students helped develop the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) that is now used throughout the United States, Canada, and Mexico (other nations have deployed similar systems in other regions). Broadcasting a message that ensures integrity of the signal and provides small corrections to natural errors, WAAS notifies users of faulty satellite signals within 6 s; its corrections additionally support positioning accuracies of a few meters [
15].
In another collaboration with Parkinson’s Stanford research group, the FAA funded a 1992 loan of a Boeing 737 from United Airlines to the team for landing experiments. The advanced, GPSbased, position-sensing technique known as differential GPS enabled the aircraft to measure its own position with centimeter accuracy and its attitude to one degree or better [
11]. Using GPS-only measurements, Parkinson’s team demonstrated 110 ‘‘blind” landings (executed by autopilot alone under instrument guidance and monitored by a human pilot ready to retake control if needed) [
16]. Today, the FAA is in the process of authorizing the use of GPS for less automated (Category I) precision landings and has committed to developing specifications for GPS-only, Category III landings, which are ‘‘blind” through touchdown. The agency has also made determining aircraft positions via satellite navigation a central element of its ongoing modernization of the US air traffic control system, called NextGen. That massive upgrade began in the early 2000s and is scheduled to continue until at least 2025.
Pursuing another, purely terrestrial, high-precision application of GPS, also in the 1990s, Parkinson’s Stanford program received financial support and a tractor from the American agricultural equipment company John Deere. The student research team modified the tractor, adding GPS-based guidance and control to create the world’s first fully robotic farm tractor in 1996. The control system achieved driverless steering to 2.54 cm at a tractor speed of 5 m·s
-1 and attitude measurement of the vehicle to a single degree in each dimension. This research has led to the wide adoption of GPS-guided precise positioning in farming, which helps farmers meet the challenge of increasing crop yields and lowering costs with faster and more efficient planting and harvesting (Fig. 10). The pinpoint application of fertilizers and pesticides can also reduce the environmental impact of raising crops. Annual worldwide sales of the GPS-based, auto-farming industry have surpassed 1 billion USD [
17].
Fig. 10. (a) A Starfire(D) GPS receiver installed at the canopy front of this John Deere 8345 RT tractor guides its satellite-assisted steering system. (b) Guided by precision GPS, Precision Mazes (Lee’s Summit, Mo, USA) created this corn maze in Sunderland, MA, USA. Credits: bdk, Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0); Precision Mazes (public domain).
Among the first GPS users to find ways to exceed the system’s nominal positioning accuracy, scientists and surveyors developed novel measurement techniques that require more time and more complex setups but can take measurements using GPS with millimeter accuracy, a thousand-fold more precise than normal GPS position fixes. Such exacting GPS measurements are aiding scientific investigations [
18] in fields from seismology, landslide motion, and plate tectonics to atmospheric and other environmental studies (Fig. 11). Precision GNSS measurements and guidance have also spread to mining and to the control of rapidly proliferating drones. Meanwhile, the expanding applications of ordinary GPS now encompass emergency response and rescues of all sorts, wildlife tracking, border enforcement, fishing regulation, weather forecasting, and innumerable other uses.
Fig. 11. (a) A Smithsonian Institution researcher uses a high-precision GPS device to survey a sand dune in 2005 at Ibex Dunes in Death Valley National Park in California, USA. (b) A US Geological Survey (USGS) team sets up a portable ‘‘spider” instrumentation package containing high-precision GPS units to monitor movement in a March 2014 landslide in northwest Washington, USA. Credits: Jim Zimbelman, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution (public domain); Jonathan Godt, USGS (public domain).
A huge boost to the usefulness of GPS for ordinary people worldwide occurred in 2000. Acceding to long-voiced pleas from the commercial sector, US President Bill Clinton ordered the permanent cessation of selective availability, ending degradation of the civil signal (Fig. 12). With this decision and the application of WAAS corrections, mobile phones could attain 2–3 m accuracy under a clear sky, making possible the street-level navigation these phones now routinely provide. In fact, ‘‘selective availability was an aggravation, but denied no one full accuracy,” Parkinson said. ‘‘Ironically, the US Coast Guard was operating a nationwide system that broadcast corrections to remove the deliberate errors applied by the DoD.”
Fig. 12. These two figures compare the accuracy of GPS with and without selective availability (SA), each plotting 24 h of GPS data, (a) on the day before and (b) the day after SA was discontinued on 2 May 2000. The plot on the left with SA shows accuracy to within a radius of ~45 m; the plot on the right without SA shows accuracy to within a radius of ~6 m. Credit: Ashley Hornish, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution (public domain).
A dramatic decrease in the size, weight, power use, and cost of GPS receivers also spurred the huge leap in their use. Technicians had assembled the early, bulky instruments from discrete components, according to the state of the art at that time, as compact, lighter, integrated-circuit technology was still in its infancy. But starting a decade or so later, the novel circuit-making approach had matured enough to set off a fast transformation to smaller, more energy efficient, and much less expensive GPS receivers with far greater capabilities. Whereas the first GPS receivers, although intended to be relatively user-friendly in price and portability, cost more than 100 000 USD and weighed ~50 kg, today’s manufacturers buy the tiny GPS chips used in smart phones for less than 2 USD apiece.
After the success of GPS in Desert Storm and subsequent military operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, the US military finally embraced its satellite navigation system. ‘‘Suddenly, the Air Force got religion. They realized what they had,” said Parkinson. From then on, the brainchild of the ‘‘space weenies,” as the astronautical engineers who developed GPS were derisively known, became an essential component of DoD weapons systems, missions, and maneuvers. For the fiscal year 2020, the annual US federal appropriation for military and civilian uses of GPS totaled nearly 1.8 billion USD [
19].