Electricity industry restructuring should not sacrifice supply security to pursue economic efficiency. Till now there is no academic consensus on which electricity market design provides the least distorting investment incentives. This paper discusses alternative approaches that have been adopted around the world for ensuring the appropriate level of investment in electric generation capacity, and much attention is devoted on the evaluation of capacity payment systems. Our finding is that on one hand, capacity payment systems have good effect on reducing spot market price volatility and increasing the volume of generating capacity at the costs of relatively high total electricity prices; on the other hand, however, they are not robust against either the abuse of market power in the energy market or being manipulated.

Electricity industry restructuring should not sacrifice supply security to pursue economic efficiency. Till now there is no academic consensus on which electricity market design provides the least distorting investment incentives. Alternative approaches that have been adopted around the world for ensuring the appropriate level of investment in electric generation capacity are discussed, and much attention is devoted on the evaluation of capacity payment systems. The finding is that on one hand, capacity payment systems have good effect on reducing spot market price volatility and increasing the volume of generating capacity at the costs of relatively high total electricity prices; on the other hand, however, they are not robust against either the abuse of market power in the energy market or being manipulated.