
基于策略型消费者的易逝品最优定价研究
Optimal pricing of perishable goods under strategic consumers
Chen Xiaohong、Yi Guodong、Cheng Lulu
随着信息获取变得越来越方便快捷,消费者策略行为在日常生活中变得越来越普遍。同时,产品的易腐蚀性使得时间敏感的消费者的选择更复杂。本文研究存在策略型消费者的易腐蚀性产品最优定价问题。垄断厂商在一定时期内销售有限个产品,消费者根据效用最大化原则选择自身的最优购买时机。本文分为不补充库存和补充库存两种情形。研究表明,厂商与消费者之间存在博弈均衡,厂商公布定价策略后,存在最优的阈值函数划分消费者结构。消费者的策略行为对厂商利润有重大影响,厂商可以根据市场需求状况和消费者时间敏感程度通过适当的库存和价格设定来减少消费者策略行为带来的损失。补充库存只有在市场需求较大的时候才优于不补充库存情形。
With access to information is becoming more and more convenient and quick, the strategic behavior of customers is becoming more common in everyday life. In this paper, we study the optimal pricing of perishable goods in the presence of strategic customers. Monopolist sells a finite quantify of products in a certain period of time. Customers select the optimal time to buy based on the principle of utility maximization. This paper is divided into two scenarios including not replenish inventory and replenish inventory. Studies have shown that the game equilibrium exists between sellers and consumers. After a seller announces the pricing strategy, the structure of customers is divided by an optimal threshold function. The strategic behavior of customers has a significant impact on the profits of a seller. A seller can accord to the market demand and the time sensitivity of customers through proper inventory and price setting to reduce losses from the strategic behavior of customers. The situation with replenishing inventory is better than the situation without replenishing inventory only when market demand is larger.
易逝品 / 策略型消费者 / 最优定价 / Stackelberg博弈
perishable goods / strategic consumers / optimal pricing / Stackelberg game
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