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engineering supervision 1

incentive compatibility constraint(IC) 1

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The Study on Supervision Institution Incentive System Based on Asymmetric Information

Cao Yugui,Yang Zhongzhi

Strategic Study of CAE 2005, Volume 7, Issue 10, Pages 69-72

Abstract:

The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers’ investment, special character of engineering supervision and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervision are put forward.

Keywords： employer engineering supervision principal-agent incentive system

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A Study About IC and IR in Principal-gent RelationshipUnder the Engineer Supervision Institution

Qin Xuan

Strategic Study of CAE 2007, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 45-49

Abstract: compatibility constraint(IC)and the participation constraint (IR) in principal-gent relationship between employerIf the employer wants to improve the engineer supervision institution, it must adopt incentive mechanisms

Keywords： engineer supervision employer engineer principal-gent incentive compatibility constraint(IC) participation