2005, Volume 7, Issue 10
Strategic Study of CAE >> 2005, Volume 7, Issue 10
The Study on Supervision Institution Incentive System Based on Asymmetric Information
1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
2. School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200030, China
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Abstract
The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers’ investment, special character of engineering supervision and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervision are put forward.
Keywords
employer ; engineering supervision ; principal-agent ; incentive system
References
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