2007, Volume 9, Issue 3
Strategic Study of CAE >> 2007, Volume 9, Issue 3
Nanjing University of Science & Technology
1. Nanjing University of Science & Technology, Nanjing 210000, China ;
2. Nanjing Municipal Development and Reform Committee, Nanjing 210000, China
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Abstract
Aiming at the success of the franchise of Nanjing Cioss-River Tunnel, this paper analysis the structure of the risks in the infrastructure franchise and its influences. For it is impossible to get a complete contract between the private sector and the government, the goverment should take some appropriate measures and set up a good governance structure to deal with these risks, which is a key factor to affect the success of franchise.
Keywords
franchise ; Nanjing Cross-River Tunnel ; incomplete contract ; risk ; governance
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References
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