2023, Volume 25, Issue 6
Strategic Study of CAE >> 2023, Volume 25, Issue 6 doi: 10.15302/J-SSCAE-2023.06.008
Development of Security Protection Technologies for Industrial Control System
Cyberspace Institute of Advanced Technology, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
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Abstract
Industrial control system (ICS) is gradually transitioning from being closed and isolated to open and interconnected. The network threats to ICS are becoming highly hidden, strong-confrontation, and cross-domain in nature. Once subjected to cyberattacks, industrial production will be directly affected. Consequently, network attacks on ICS and corresponding security protection technologies have attracted significant attention. This study focuses on the security protection issues of ICS. First, we analyzed the specific characteristics of ICS security protection, as well as the unclear and uncontrollable security challenges of ICS. The network attacks on ICS are summarized and analyzed, and then the security protection systems with a self-defense mode, such as border protection and defense in depth, are discussed. In view of the security challenges, the development ideas are given from the aspects of security and controllability of ICS and a novel security protection system of ICS, and key tasks and key technology research paths are as follows: establishing an autonomous and controllable ICS security ecology and a security assurance mechanism of foreign devices based on limiters, and exploring the new security protection system of ICS based on a self-defense plus guard mode, such that the security protection ability of ICS can be better improved.
Keywords
industrial control system ; security protection ; autonomous and controllable ; new security-protection architecture ; guard mode
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